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Every rul2f makes enemies. [There are no
exceotlons.] ... If one chooses sides on emotion,
then the Rebel is the gUY to go wi tho He IS
fighting for everything men claim to honor:
freedom, indeoendence, truth, the right ... all
the subjective illusions, all the eternal
trigger-words • .••
There are no self-oroclaimed villains only
regiments of self-oroclaimed saints. Victorious
historians rule where good or evil 1ies.

-- Glen Cook, The Black Company

The Bolsheviks did not have a monopoly on revolution nor were they
the predominant force during the February Revolutior, in 1917.

The

Bolsheviks reoresented on!>'a small, though important, pol i tical grouD

•

of the ultra-extreme left.

On the left they were rivalled by another

politic.al group, often over-looKed and forgotten, the anarchists.

The

anar-chists were the ultra-left of the pop'Jlist political tradition,
while the BolsheviKs were the ultra-left of the Social Democratic or
Marxist Doliti,:al tradition.

The anarchists played an important role in

Russian radical pol itics- in the mid-19th century long before
became a viable ideology in Russia.

~Iarxism

The anarchists trace their

ideological origins bacK to the Russian emigres BaKunin and Kropotkin
and to the Frenchman Proudhon.

The anarchists have always been a

relatively small group but theY have exerted gr-eat influence in
prooortion to their numbers.

The February Revolution was not a

BolsheviK one and the October coup d'etat was not a Durell' Bolshevik
affair either.

•

In fact virtuallY- all of the extreme lefti-st Darties,

Left Social Revolutionaries (SRs), MensheviKs, and anarchists, were
eager to be rid of KerensKy and his Provisional Government.

•

The anarchists were strongest in Petrograd and its surrounding
territory and in the Ukraine.

In each of these centers of influence the

anarchists h9.ve their own story to tell

that is in many ways different

from the Bolshevik oerspective on the same events.

Ir, particular, two

events are often cited as being in some way purely anarchist: The
activi ties of Nestor Makhno in the Ukraine and trle Kronstadt Rebellion
of 1921.

While Makhno is often brushed aside and forgotten by everyone

except the anarchist·s, the Kronstadt J;:ebell ion remains a hotly disouted
event by all sides of the pol i tical spectrum.

In 1921 the defeated

adversaries of the Bolsheviks were all quick to declare the rebellion to
be theirs by inspiration, the supposed Third Revolution.

Who were the

anarchists and what role did they 010.)' in regard to Kronstadt?

•

happened at Kronstadt that makes the event so important?
responsible for the rebel 1 ion?

What

Who really was

What is the anarchist perspective a.nd

how did it differ from the Bolshevik's?

These are the questions that

will be answered in the following pages.
To begin, one needs to understand the setting.

Geography and

various demograohic factors are important to the understanding of the
Kr'onstadt incident.

Kronstadt is a city situated on the 12 X 3

kilometer Kotl in Island in the Finni'sh Gulf, 30 kilometers west of
Petro·;wad.

It is the principal base of the Baltic Fleet.

is strewn with fortifications and artillery batteries.
the east side,

in the city, closest to Petrograd.

Kotl in Island

The docks are on

The island is

surrounded by forts and batteries all around the bay to the north and

•

south.

Krasnaia Gorka is 20 kilometers to the southwest.

10 kilometers to the north.

Lissy Noss is

Kronstadt, the bay forts, and numerous

small fortresss in the bay were all carefully designed to defend

•

Petr-ograd; Kr-onstadt was to be the center-oiece. (Vol ine, 441)

The

fortifications were formidable.

The city of Kr-onstadt was an industr-ial naval town of about 82,000.

This figur-e consists of about 20,000 soldier-s, 12,000 sailor-s, and
50,000 civil ians most of whom wer-e factor-Y wor-ker-s.

By 1921, after-

numerous detachments had been sent to fight the civil war-, the
pooulation

to ar-ound 50,000, while the composition did not change

fell

significantly.

Ther-e wer-e ar-ound 27,000 sailor-s and soldier-s at the

time of the 1921 uor-ising.
Russian mil itar-y.

The natur-e of this for-ce is unique to the

The needs of the moder-n Russian navy under the Tsar

r-equir-ed a I iter-ate and ver-y skilled sailor-.

Hence, about 84% wer·e

I iter-ate and most wer-e recr-uited fr-om the wor-king class.

•

Three of four

s.ai lor-s came for-m the urban pr·oletar·iat, which was qui te the opposi te of
the pr-edominent peasant backgr-ound of the r-egular- soldier- in the ar-my.
The ar-my of 1917 only dr-ew about 3% of its r-ecr-uits fr-om industr-ial
backgr-ounds. (Getzler- 7,10,205)

By 1921, tr,e composition of Kr-onstadt

changed to a more pronounced peasant backgr-ound and dr-awn fr-om the
Ukr-aine and the Baltics.
The situation throughout Russia in late 1920 and ear-ly 1921 was one
of desper-ation for the peoole.

The Civil War- was winding down.

The

gr-eat White ar-mies and for-eign inter-ventionists had been lar-gely
defeated.

The countr-y was on the edge of economic collapse, shortage of

all goods wer-e r-ampant.

Star-vation lur-ked ar-ound all cor-ner-s.

Dur-ing

1920 Russia suffered a sever-e dr-ought and the winter pr-oved to be

•

especially har-sh.

SPor-adic peasant upr-isings were erupting allover

Russia, especially in the Ukr-aine, the Tambov r-egion and Siber-ia, wher-e
the upr-isings and subsequent supr-essions wer-e often br-utal. (Avrich.

•

13-16)

The peasants were rising against a BolsheviK pol icy known as War

Communism.

The BolsheviKs had a standing pol icy of forced

requisitioning which was pr'acticed with vast local abuse.

Despite the

fact that civil war was winding down, the BolsheviKs did not feel
themselv~s

to be in a secure position! since civil war could easily

start again and might turn the oeasant masses against the dictatorship
of the proletariat.
Petrograd,

tl~o

In starK contrast to the rest of Russia and

observers, Ieronymos YasinsKy, a party lecturer, and

Skoromnyi, a sailor, recalled that Kronstadt was prosperous and in good
order in the fall of 1920. (Getzler, 208)
The striKes in Petrograd during February were just one of many
causes that insoired the Kronstadt Rebell ion.
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The bitter discontent of

the ·;·ailors against the BolsheviKs began in the summer of 1920.

In June

TrotsKy aooointed Fioder RasKolniKov as Commander of the Baltic Fleet
with the purpose of restoring the integrity of the fleet.

The

aopointment itself was controversial in the sense that the BolsheviKs
imposed their authority over the Kronstadt Soviet by appointing
officials that were not the chosen representatives of the sailors.
Since 1918 the BoslsheviKs had been slowly enforcing their will uoon the
;ailor's who, in 1917, had virtual!)' declared their independence fr'om
Russia.

With some mumbl ing, RasKolniKov was acceoted, if for no other

reason than as a necessary consequence of the civil war, which was still
being waged at the time.
Upon aopointment, RasKolniKov replaced two-thirds of the commanding

•

officers and party leaders with his chosen favorites, from the days he
served in the Caspian Sea.

The reolacements introduced an element of

ethnic unrest as most of these new replacements were of Eastern origin.

s

•

To maKe matters worse, RasKolniKov implemented changes in the form of
privilege.

Thus RasKolniKov and his officers got the best rations, the

best housing, the best clothing and enjoyed various social privileges,
all above arid beyond what theY really needed.
the expense of others.

They flaunted it too at

In December 1920, food shortages finally hit

Kronstadt but RasKolniKov and his favorites were never short of fuel or
food.

The ire of the sailors was tremendous, reminding the few veterans

of 1917 of the late Admiral Viren under the Tsar.

Other measures were

also r·eminiscent of Adm. Viren: the overtly harsh discipl ine, the
restricted freedom of movement, the prohibition to gather or organize
and the weak effort to isolate the s.ai lors from unofficial propaganda.
RasKolnikov used the Tcheka to root out undesirable SR's, Mensheviks,

•

~nd

anyone else that the Bolsheviks did not approve of.

pol itical intolerance ran smack into sailor expechtions.

This pol icy of
Part of the

program developed among the revolutionaries in 1917 was an open system
of multiparty government in the soviet.

The Bolsheviks charged those

arrested with counter-revolutionary sympathies if not outright
conspiracy.

The sailors were not sYmpathetic to

counter-revolutionaries, but the parties of the left were never
counter-revolutionary in the sailors' eyes. (Getzler 210-212)
Not on!>' did Raskolnikov al ienate the sai lors but he got into
trouble wi th Petrograd.

As part of his pol icy to restructure the Bal tic

Fleet, he sought to bring the Petrograd naval base under his authority.
Gregori Zinoviev, who was the BolsheviK party boss in Petrograd, would

•

have nothing of it.

Trotsky and Zinoviev were fierce rivals at the time

and RasKolnikov was Trotsky's man.
that confl ict.

Kronstadt then became a victim of

Zinoviev did not want anything to do wi th RaskolniKov.

6
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As a resul t of this confl iet, Raskolnikov's eHorts to reconstruct the
integrity of the Baltic Fleet failed by the end of January 1921.
(Getzler 211-212)
The discontent among the sailors was driven by more than just
shortages and Raskolnikov.

Just as in 1917, the soldiers and sailors

were unusually concer'ned wi th the I ives of the oeas!lnts.

When on leave,

the men would return to their homes to see and hear the latest news.
They got to see Lenin's War Communism in action.

Forced grain

collections and illegal requisitioning were ramoant throughout the
countryside.

Lenin knew what was going on but for the most Dart was

unable to do much about it.
Pa.rty

•

l~ere

Those who were caught by the Communist

severely punished. (Lenin, 41)

and sailors only knew what theY saw.

Nevertheless, the soldiers

The state of affairs in the

countryside was oretty well known to the Kronstadters and this affected
their la.ter actions.

As a resul t. the decl ine in Communist oart."

membership accelerated.

In March of 1920 mebership was around 5,630, b."

December 1920 membershio fell to 2.228.

Membershio to the party

continued to fall as the crisis deepened. (Getzler 208-212)
Around mid-Februar." Raskolnikov left Kronstadt and party control of
Kronstadt soon collaosed.

The administrative structure for the city and

fleet collapsed entirely, leaving a power vacuum to be filled by the
sai lors.

Whi Ie in thi·s state of I imbo and uncer·taint.", events in

Petrograd began to heat up.

Strikes in several large factories erupted.

The workers were demanding provisions and fuel.

•

It should be noted that

Communist part." members and other important officials were adequately
suppl ied during the shortages, in eHect privi lege was the i·ssue.

Due

to the harsh winter, Petrograd and much of the north was virtuall."

7
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isolated from the rest of the country.
however, fell on deaf ears.
workers back to work.

The demands of the workers,

Zinoviev and other officials ordered the

Units of the Kursanti (officer cadets) and Tcheka

were used to break up meetings and protests.

The Party officials

declared the strikes as part of a counter-revolutionary plot by
Mensheviks and SRs.

Petrograd became a garrisoned city virtually

overnight. (Avrich Kronstadt, 45-47)
Due to Kronstadt's isolation, news of the strikes did not reach the
island untj I February 26, 1921.

The sai lors wer·e qui te concerned.

The

sailors of the battleships Sevastopol and Petropavlovsk met and elected
a fact-finding delegation of 32 men, one of which was the sailor
Petrichenko, to go to Petrograd and get the story.

•

Upon arrival,

February 27, theY found a ci ty in turmoi I and in a state of fr.ightened
calm.

During the day several more factories suspended ooerations.

government ordered them back to work wi th little effect.

The

Zinoviev who

had organized a Committee for Defense to deal with the situation a
couole days earl ier, declared Martial Law in the ci ty and lock-outs were
implemented in several fa.ctories.

The lock-outs had the effect of

denying the workers all rations, hence condemning them to starvation.
(Berkman Bolshevik, 291-292) The delegates had difficulty getting anyone
to talk because many of the workers feared the local party workers and
Tchekist agents.

The Mensheviks, under the direction of Fiodor Dan, did

take advantage of the crisis to spread leaflets condemning the Bolshevik
dictator·shio and demanding free election of so.,iets for all pol itical

•

parties. iGetzler, 212-213)

During the crisis thousands of Mensheviks

and SRs were arrested and imprisoned nationwide by the Tcheka. (Avrich
Kronstadt, 47-48)

•

As a side note, very few anarchists had their freedam in February
1921.

Most were in jail, in the Ukraine or dead.

Alexander Berkman and

Emma Goldman, two deported Russian-American anarchists were in Petrograd
at the time of the uprising.

Other notable anarchists such as Vol ine,

Aaron Baron, Maksimov, Karel in and the Gordon brothers were in prison
for their pol i tical posi tions.

The pi ight of the Russian a.narchists

received much sympathy from anarchists abroad.

Though most of the

leader; of the anarchists were in jail, there were thousands of people
who were sympathetic to the anarchist cause or who worked with it.
Perepelkin has been regarded as an anarchist and Petrichenko has been

•

con;idered sympathetic. (Avr'ich Kronstadt, 167-170)

Similar problems

can be seen with the SRs of both the left and right.

Though the SR's

were not anarchists. the two followings held similer views on many
issue;, especially the agricultural issue.

The

SR-~1axims.1

ists, a

faction of the SRs, seemed to lean toward the anarchists in their
outlook than the regular SRs.

Many SR-Maximal ists still resided on

Kronstadt, most notabl>' Anatoll ia Lamenov.

The only real difference

between the SR-Maximal ists and the anarcrlists lay' in the degree of party
organization and the usefulness of indiscriminant violence.
1~'17

Back in

the 11aximal ist faction had or,]y existed as part of the Non-Party

group along with anarchists, though a Maximal ist faction of the SRs
existed long before 1917.
February 28th, the delegation returned to the battleships where a
general meeting of the crews was held, Stephan Petrichenko and Piotr

•

Perepelkin presiding.

The findings of the delegation were read.

The

Communist leaders of Kronstadt were in attendence, Pavel Vasil iev and
Andrian Zosimov.

These two men both tried in vain to block the events

•

that were to occur.

A resolution was drawn up expressing the concerns

and demands of the sailors, a vote was taken and the resolution was
adopted by the sailors.

Vasiliev, Zosimov, and the Commisar of the

Baltic Fleet, N. Kuzmin were furious.

The

Corr~unists

called a general

gathering of all Kronstadters in Anchor Square for the next day.
(Getzler 212-213)

Meanwhile in Petrograd the unrest was beginning to

take on a pol,itical tone.

A proclam.ation was posted, in Petrograd, in

the afternoon condemning the Bolsheviks and demanding free elections,
freedoms of speech and press, freedom of assembly, and the I iberation of
arrested political prisoners. (Berkman Bolshevik, 2$'2)
March 1st, in Kronstadt a massive gathering of 15-16,000 soldiers,
sailors and workers gathered in Anchor Square.

•

Mikhail Kal inin,

Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets,
arrived to look the situation over and speak to the people gathered.
Kal inin was greeted with mil itary honors.
Vasil iev and Nikolai Kuzmin.
hostile but subdued.

Accompanying him was Pavel

The mood of the crowd was extremely

Apparently Kal inin noticed the mood of the crowd,

and suggested that the meeting be moved indoors to the Naval Manage
where the crowd would be smaller.

The crowd quickly refused demanding

that if something important needed to be stated then it could be spoken
in the square.

The various accounts of this gathering are mixed but

clearly the sailors were in no mood to comoromise and neither was
Kal inin.

After a harsh shouting match between the Communists and the

peoole gathered, Perepelkin moved to adopt the resolution drawn up the

•

previous day.

The motion was seconded by Petrichenko and put to a vote

immediately in front of the Communist officials.

The resolution was

adopted unanimously with Vasil iev, Kuzmin and Kal inin each opposed.
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Kalinin denounced the

~esolution

as

counte~-~evolutiona~y and

that the Soviet Union was not about to let
The

~esolution

K~onstadt

made

clea~

go without a fight.

adopted is as follows:

"Resolution of the Gene~al Meeting of the
1st and 2nd SQuad~ons of the Baltic Fleet, held
on Mar-ch 1s t, 1921.
"Afte~ having hea~d the ~epo~ts of the
delegates sent to Pet~ograd by the gene~al
meeting of the c~ews to examine the situation,
the assembly decided that, since it has been
establ ished that the p~esent Soviets do not
exp~ess the wi II of the wo~ker"s and peasants, it
is neocessary:
1. to p~oceed immediately to the

of the Soviets by sec~et ballot, the
campaign among wo~ke~s and peasants to
be ca~~ied on with full f~eedom of speech and

~e-election
electo~al

ac t i on ;

2.

•

to establ ish f~eedom of soeech and
all wo~ke~s and peasants, fo~ the
Ana~chists and Left Social ist pa~ties;
3. to accord f~eedom of assembly to the
p~ess fo~

workers~

4.

and peasants' organisations;

to convoke, outsi,je of the pol itical
a Confe~ence of the wo~ke~s, Red
soldie~s and sailo~s of Pet~og~ad, K~onstadt and
the Pet~og~ad p~ovince fo~ Ma~ch 10th, 1921,_ at
the latest;
5. to libe~ate all Socialist political
p~isone~s and also all wo~ke~s, peasants, Red
soldiers and sailors, imprisoned as a res-ul t of
pa~ties,

the workers' and peasants' movements;

6. to elect a commission fo~ the purpose
of examining the cases of those who a~e in
prisons or concentration camps;
7. to abo I ish the 'p 0 lit ica I off ice s' ,
since no pol i tical pa~ty should have p~ivi leges
fo~ p~opagating its ideas o~ ~eceive money f~om
the State fo~ this pu~pose, and to ~eplace them
with educational and cultu~al commissions
elected in each local i ty and financed bY the
governmen t;

8.

to abolish immediately all [int~astatel
[to t~adel;
9. to make unifo~m the ~ations of all
wo~ke~s, except fo~ those engaged in occupations
dange~ous to thei~ health;
10. to abol ish the Communist shock-t~ooos
in all units of the a~my and the Communist
ba~~iers

•

guards in the factories; in case of need, guard

II

•

detachments could be supplied in the army by the
companies and in the factories by the workers;
11. to give the peasants full fr·eedom of
action in rega.rd to their land and a.lso the
right to possess cattle, on condition that they
do their own work, that is to say, without
hiring helpi
12. to establ ish a travel 1ing control
commission;
13. to permit the free excercise of
handicrafts, provided no hired help is used;
14. we ask all uni to of the army and the
Kursanti cadets to join our resolution;
15. we demand that all our resolutions be
widely pub 1 icised in the press.
This resolution was adopted unanimously by the
meeting of the crews of the two Squadrons. Two
persons abstained.
Signed: Petrichenko, president of the
meeting: Perepelkin, socretary.'
(Vol ine, 473-475)

•

In looKing at clause 2 one wi 11 notice that the freedoms of speech
and of the press are only to be given to the various leftist parties.
Vol ine suggests that the Kronsladters were, fr·om the very beginning,
very concerned about the dangers of misunderstanding by outsiders.

As

would be later seen, the BolsheviKs were quicK to accuse Kronstadt of
being guided by reactionarY elements.

The fact that the resolution only

called for partial freedoms of speech and the press is, perhaps, a
reflection of this concern. but this conclusion is uncertain at best.
(Vol ine. 473)

The conference called for was never held nor were

elections to the Kronstadt Soviet ever held.

This was perhaps

acceptable in I ight of the events that tooK place.
Back in Petrograd, the TcheKa had arrested large numbers of people.

•

The

trade unions

wer·e

being I iquidated but the unrest continued.

Zinoviev is reported to have called on Moscow for mil itary
reinforcements to support the unrel iable forces in the pr·ovince.

/2..
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Extraordinary Martial Law was declared in Petrograd. (BerKman BolsheviK,
21"2-293)

At the sa.me time roadblocKs were lifted to permi t freer tr-ade

which suddenly pr-ovided the town with gener-ous provisions of food and
clothing. (Getzler-, 221)

Other- concessions wer-e being pr-epar-ed.

Mar-ch 2nd, a Conference of Delegates was held in Kr-onstadt with
equal r-epresentation for- all inter-ests.
attended, with PetrichenKo presiding.

Thr-ee-hundred-three delegates
The business of the meeting

consisted of establ ishing a tempor-ary Provisional Revolutionar>'
Committee to manage
be held.

the 'situation until elections for- the Soviet could

The Committee was made up of a 5 member- Presidium. to be later

expanded to 15 members on March 4th.

The member-s included: Petr-ichenKo,

a sailor-; YaKovenKo, who was a telephone operator; Oreshin, who was a

•

teacher at the third Technical School, per-haps the only one to be part
of the Intell igentsia; TuKin, who was an electr-ician; and Ar-Khipov, who
was a mechanic.

Wi th the exception of Oreshin, all 15 members of the

Committee wer-e of Pr-oletar-ian bacKgrounds, (Vol ine, 48B)

Kuzmin and

Vasi I iev were both pr-esent at the Confer-ence and ster-nly war-ned again
that the Communists were not about to let Kronstadt go without a
struggle.

The Committee tooK them ser-iously and had them promptly

arrested.

Kal inin, who was sti 11 in town, was allowed to r-etur-n to

Petrograd.

The issue of how to deal with the remaining Communists on

the island was discussed.

They wer-e fr-ee to Join the Conference if they

desired, the others were allowed to leave if they chose.

It should be

noted that lar-ge numbers of Party member-s did defect to the Kr-onstadt

•

cause.

The publ ication of the Kronstadt newspaper-, Izvestia was also

establ i shed dur- i ng the Confer-ence.

/3.
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Of particular interest is a rumor that got started at the
Conference.

The rumor claimed that the Communists had trucKloads of

armed soldiers already on the way to breaK up the meeting.

It was only

a rumor but at the time the delegates tooK it seriously and got whipped
into a frenzy.

A quicK decision was made to seize all important

facilities of the island and of the var-ious forts around the Gulf.

All

but Krasnaia GorKa and Oranienbaum were seized and not a shot fired.

It

has been ar-gued that the Kronstadters were, in fact, the first to taKe
offensive military action as a result of the March 2nd decision, not the
BolsheviKs.
rumor.

The real question should be directed to the origins of the

Mystery surrounds it.

The rumor seems too conveniently laid and

it did succeed in further polarizing the situation.

•

conspiracy to cause trouble?

Was there perhaps a

No evidence exists to prove it one way or

the other.
News of what was happening in Russia was getting out abroad.
Victor Chernov, the former Chairman of the Constituent Assembly, offered
to provision Kronstadt with the help of Russian emigres.

The SR party

in Russia 1iKewise offered to aid Kronstadt in any way necessary.

The

Provisional Revolutionary Commi ttee (PRO turned down the offers unti I
circumstances changed but they would Keep them in mind. (BerKman
Kronstadt, 16)
exu I tan t.

Alfred Rosmer points out that the foreign press became

The ex i I ed em i gres and the fore i gn press were a II eager to

join in on the side of Kronstadt without even considering the program
that the sai lors had to offer.

•

overthrowing the Bolsheviks.

To the emigres, a_II that matter-ed was
The event was hailed as the Third

Revolution by anarchists and others abroad. (FranK, 16-17)

As such,

plans were being made to seize the moment once the ice started to melt

1'1
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in the Gulf.

The BolsheviKs knew very well what the emigres were UP to,

but it is not at all cl ear if Kronstadt knew.
Back in Petrograd, March 2, Kal inin and Zinoviev set about
isolating the island with the help of loyal Kursanti cadets and the
Peterhof Battal ion.

The strikes were more or less subdued by force and

by concessions of provisions that were rushed in to alleviate worKer
demands.

In Moscow, Lenin and TrotsKy (Trotsky had been recalled from

Siberia where he had been suppressing peasant uprisings) issued the
first official anouncement.

The statement declared the disturbance as

counter-revolutionary and instigated bY the French and White guard
emigres.

The Petropavlovsk Resolution was regarded as being an SR-Black

Hundred resolution.

•

General Kozlovsky was accused of being in charge of

the uprising in Kronstadt. (Lenin, 67)
in the statement issued.

An element of truth does exist

The French did Know about the uprising.

There

was a General Kozlovsky in Kronstadt, who had served under the Tsar.
His role was, however, rather- passive.

He was in charge of the

artillery and had been assigned to the Baltic Fleet by Trotsky a few
years back.

Upon Commissar Kuzmin's arrest, Kozlovsky was supposed to

have succeeded him.
Commisar.

Yet General Kozlovsky refused the posi tion of

He supposedly strongly recommended that the sailors take the

offensive immediately and seize Oranienbaum.

Oranienbaum was of

dr-ategic importance for its surprise potential and for the 50,000 poods
of food that were stored there for the fleet.

Kronstadt only had two

weeks worth of rations on the island at the start of the uprising.

•

Never the less, the PRC refused the recommenda t ion.
advic~,

Beyond the in it ial

Gen. KozlovsKy served no important role in Kronstadt/s uprising.

I~

•

Even so, the Bolsheviks used him and his immediate aides for a very
successful though false propaganda campaign. (Vol ine, 485-487)
March 3rd, Izvestia started publ ishing the newspaper for Kronstadt.
The editor was Anatoll i Lamanov.

He was an SR-Maximal ist and his

political views 'supported the maxim of 'all
to political parties'.

pOI.~er

to the soviets and not

It is in the pages of Izvestia that he and

Perepelkin set about promoting their ideas and publ ishing the workings
of the PRC. (Getzler, 229-230)

Fourteen issues were printed during the

two week affair and it is from these issues that author's of the various
secondary works cited got much of their information.

The PRC spent the

day working on getting matters organized on the island itself.
Elections were held for various positions in the factories and in the

•

mil itary.

Housing needs were looked into.

It is on March 3rd that the propaganda war got fully underway.
Berkman does not record anything terribly significant other than that
word of Kronstadt had finally gotten around to the general population of
Petrograd.

The Bolsheviks were using everything in their power to

convince the people that the sailors had erred and that they should
surrender immediately.

A long radio message was broadcast from Moscow

repeating the same condemnation of the sai lors. (Vol ine, 482)

The

unrest in Petrograd had ended, though Berkman impl ies that it was fear
and uncertainty that kept matters silent.

Kronstadt's Izvestia claimed

that unrest was still gripping Petrograd and expressed hope that the
workers would rise up in rebell ion.

•

In the meantime, Kal inin and

Zinoviev were waiting for reinforcements and Trotsky.
March 4th, the entire Petrograd Province was placed under martial
la.w.

~10re

arrests took place and hostages were taken in I ieu of the
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arrests of Kuzmin and Vasil iev.

garrisoned by loyal troops.

The city's government facil ities were

Late that night the Petrograd Soviet met to

discuss the matter.

TrotsKy was supposed to be there but his train was

delayed by weather.

The Soviet was pacKed with Communists but others

were pres.ent.

Zinoviev presided wi th Kal inin pr·esent.

appears to have been dominated by the Communists.

The debate

What exactly went on

during the meeting is disputed but one important conclusion can be
drawn: the local Communists were not unified in their feel ings toward
Kronstadt.

Robert Daniels claims that Kal inin felt the sailor's

grievances were legitimate and their solutions even acceptable.

He goes

on to suggest that the Petrograd Soviet as a whole was in disagreement
with Moscrn. on how to resolve the crisis.

•

Moscow's decision to forcedly

suppress Kronstadt was based on exaggerated descriptions of the events
by Zinoviev. (Daniels, 245)

Nevertheless, the Soviet did condemn the

uprising as a counter-revolutionary plot and demanded that Kronstadt
surrender immediately or else.
Kronstadt repl ied that it did not want to s.hed blood, that they
bel ieved in soviet style government and that ther·e was no conspiracy
afoot.

The PRC declared that Kronstadt would defend itself if attacKed

and thus dec i ded to arm the c i v iii ans and prepare for the defense of the
island.

Elections were announced for various administrative positions

in the trade unions and in the Council of Unions.

The Council of Unions

was to represent the worKers and would Keep in contact with the PRC.
(Vol ine, 494, 504)

•

March 5th, TrotsKy arrived and issued an ul timatum to Kronstadt
demanding unconditional surrender or else suffer suporession by force of
arms. (Lenin, 67)

BerKman felt that many Communists, whom he was on
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good

t~rms

with,

disb~l i~ved

and MiKhail TuKhachevsKy
roles as

that force would be used.

arriv~d

Commanders-in-Chi~f,

80th were former Tsarist

with TrotsKy and were assigned their

TuKhachevsKy being the senior partner.
Kronstadt repeatedly pointed this

gen~rals.

fact out as a retort to the KozlovsKy accusations.
for battle were begun

to Zinoviev to

cr~at~

Zinovi~,' acc~pted th~

P~rKus

Efforts to

pr~pare

Alexander BerKman, Emma Goldman and

imm~diat~ly.

two Russian anarchists,

Sergei Kamenev

and PetrovsKy, jointly offered a proposal

a special commission to mediate
proposal but nothing

ev~r cam~

crisis.

th~

of i t.

(B~rKm.an

BolsheviK, 310-302)
March 6th, battle preparations
to the

app~al

•

citiz~ns

of

w~re

P~trograd.

Th~y

I ittle more.

Apoar~ntly

th~

From a

scatt~r~d

in

strat~gic

advantage of firepower and position.
numbers and supply.
r~b~ll

Had the

th~

th~

th~mselves

Th~

to Kronstadt and

seige w·as a ,'irtual

The BolsheviKs had superiority in

Kronstadt~rs wait~d

two

BolsheviKs had to attacK over open ice.

we~Ks

with only 15,000 men

scatt~red

Army was

were committed.
th~

Ev~n

deem~d

undependable.

later for the
As

advantag~.

Of the 50.000

The Kronstadters

defond~d

over a wide front.

troops the BolsheviKs sent in were Kursanti and

r~gular R~d

BerKman says

standpoint the sailors had the

troops commi tted, 80/: lost their I iv~s.

had

Gulf.

seig~

ion, they would have had an unfrozen Gulf to their

it was,

th~

truth.

the world was waiting for a show-down.

March 7th to March 17th, the BolsheviKs laid
the various little forts

Kronstadt issued an

declared their cause was just

and called for delegates to be sent to find out

war of attrition.

•

finished.

Many of

Tch~Ka ag~nts.

Th~

Only the most loyal troops

so, TrotsKy and TuKhachevsKy tooK no chances and

soldiers bacKed up with machine guns to

pr~vent d~s~rtion.

1'1

•

March 16th the BolsheviKs entered the city and tooK Kronstadt by the
next day.

Approximately 8000 refugees escaped to Finland, including

PetrichenKo.

What followed is largely unrecorded or unKown but

supposedly many people were executed, jailed or at the very least
relocated to other regions in the country, (Getzler, 243)
end

to the crisis.

Such was the

BerKman records an irony that on the 18th the

BolsheviKs celebrated the anniversary of the Paris Commune.

TrotsKy and

Zinoviev denounced those that suppresed the Commune with great
slaughter. (BerKman Bolshevik, 303)
Meanwhile, on March 8th to March 16th, the Tenth Party Congress was
held.

Kronstadt and the dire situation throughout Russia were the

prominent issues debated.

•

Lenin addressed the Congress several times.

He made great play of the White Guards and counter-revolution but he did
concede on the 8th that the sailors only wanted to reform the regime
with free trade and a slight shift in soviet power.

He made clear that

regardless of their intentions, Kronstadt was playing into the hands of
White Guard counter-revolutionaries.
the official I ine.

Lenin never did refute in any way

On the 15th, Lenin admitted that Kronstadt wanted

neither White Guards nor the state power of the Bolsheviks.

An element

of truth exists in Lenin's claims as will be later examined. Wetzler,
220)

During the Congress, Lenin brought forth the program that was to

be later called the NEP (New Economic Pol icy).

The

actual program had

had been voted on in the Central Commi ttee of the BolsheviK Party bacK
in Februar'y 24, 1921.

•

It is ironic that the program ratified by the

Tenth Party Congress granted many of the economic demands that were made
by Kronstadt, notably free trade and the
(FranK, 14)

end

of forced requisitions.

Myster,Y surrounds why the Bolsheviks did not just tell the

/9
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sailors that thoy had gotton what thoy wantod or, bottor yot, had
informod tho publ ic bacK in Fobruary to avoid tho crisis all togothor.
Tho BolshoviKs claimod that a conspiracy was undorfoot in
Kronstadt.

If so, what was it?

Evidonco of a conspiracy would

dofinitoly idontify tho truo naturo and purposo of tho robollion.
Robort 'J. Daniols, in a vory intor-osting analysis of tho roboll ion,
offors sovoral points of ovidonco that claim no plot was afoot among tho
Kronstadtors. (Daniols, 241-245)
timing.

Tho first point is tho mattor of

Had tho sailors waitod anothor two wooKs, tho ico would havo

boon broKon up, maKing tho island virtually imprognablo and onabl ing
rosupply.

Daniols claims that any conspiracy would havo waitod for

bottor timing.

•

Tho writor of this papor, is willing to suggost that

this is not proof against conspiracy.
gots looso, tonds to run wild.

Tho disoaso of mutiny, onco it

Had thoy waitod two wooKs, TchoKa agonts

may havo gotton suspicious and may havo activoly worKod to purgo tho
possiblo mutinoors.

Tho timing also may havo boon right.

Tho noods of

any roboll ionaro that thoro oxists a dofini tivo potential support baso.
Tho striKos in Potrograd providod an opportunity to win support.

In

fact during tho whole crisis Kronstadt consistontly appoalod to tho
pooplo of Potrograd for thoir activo support which novor manifostod.
Tho sympathy of a city doos not win battlos
doos.

activo participation

A conspiracy could not havo dopondod on possiblo unrost in two

moro wooKs..

Furthormoro, just 1iKo Kr·on·stadt, Potrograd too, could havo

boon rol iovod wi th outsido provisioning thoroby satisfying workor

•

domands.

Tho BolshoviKs had alroady docidod upon tho NEP as a solution.

Socond, Daniols points out that Kronstadt failod to taKo tho
offonsivo as advisod bY Gonoral KozlovsKy.

Again tho writor of this

•

paper does not see how this disproves a conspiracy.
made, nothing more.

A decision was

Certainly if the sailors had taKen the offensive,

events would have been very different and probably in the sailors favor.
But taKing the offensive would only have convinced the BolsheviKs and
the peoole of Petrograd that there really was a White Guard conspiracy.
Hence risKing the support potential of Petrogr·ad for the rebel I ion.

By

staying out, the sailors won some points in the image game and looKed
convincingly more I iKe r·eformers than rebels.

They also bought time to

worK out a peaceful negotiation if possible.
Third, Daniels points out that no evidence exists to suggest that
the Communists in Kronstadt suspected a conspiracy before or after the
revolt had begun.

•

This point is more convincing than the previous two.

The issue becomes one of the completeness of evidence.

One oossible

relevent consideration is that on March 17th, many of the Communists
that had been left free by the sailors in Kronstadt took up arms and
betr·ayed the other sai lor·s by fighting a.longside the BolsheviKs.
(Vol ine, 532)

Perhaps the Kronstadt Communists, who were in the

minority throughout the crisis, were just buying time by appeasing the
PRC.
Fourth, Daniels bel ieves that the release of Kal inin was a gesture
of good will.

Kal inin would have made an excellent hostage.

ar·e ho·;tages?

The BolsheviKs tooK several and the Dol icies of the PRC

did not change.
position?

•

What good

How would Kal inin's arrest have changed the BolsheviK

Why would a conspiracy bother taKing Kal inin hostage?

The

sailors held no grudge against him personally, unl iKe Kuzmin and
V·asil iev.
conspiracy.

Again this writer is not convinced that a H,ere was not a
At the same time this wr·iter feels there is no definitive

AI

•

proof of a conspiracy by the sailors.

Furthermore, BolsheviK claims to

the eHect seem to be 1 i ttle more tr,an empb' propaganda.

The question

is unresolved. (Daniels, 246-247)
Where a conspiracy among the sailors seems unresolved, conspiracy
by

outside parties does appear evident and was Known to the BolsheviKs

to some degree.

The BolsheviKs Knew that if they did not provision

Kronstadt then sailors would have np recourse but to receive provisions
from abroad.

The offers made by Lev Chernov and the SRs were known to

the BolsheviKs as was the PRC's response.

The PRC did not totally

refu·se out of hand, but rather put the issue oH for latH.

Kronstadt

was strategical II' useful for anyone desiring to resume the civil war.

A

memorandum reproduced by Pierre FranK reveals that the emigres knew in

•

advance of the potential for rebel I ion and .,ere maKing contingencY plans
if it should arise. (FranK, 26-30)

Plans were made to involve the

French and General Wrangel's forces.
interests of the sailors.

Yet no provision was made for the

The emigres merely assumed that theY

themselves would go in and displace the PRC.

The BolsheviKs may have

feared just this: that regardless of Kronstadt's true motives the Whi te
Armies would seize the island for their own purposes.

Therefore,

suppressing the rebel 1ion before the ice thawed was impHative. (FranK,
24-32)

!tshould be noted that once the rebel 1ion began all the enemies

of the BolsheviKs, foreign and domestic, hastened to join the sailors:
Left and Right SRs, MensheviKs and anarchists. (Fr·anK, 16)
The importance of the conspiracy issue is that it would clearly

•

identify the nature of the rebel I ion.

The BolsheviKs and BolsheviK

apologists all appeal to evidence of conspiracy as a means of justifying
BolsheviK actions.

The anarchists conversely point out that no

•

conspiracy existed and that the ensuing battle was unjustified.
Furthermore, the anarchists appeal to the sailors' demands as being in
some way good and the Bolsheviks efforts to suppress them is in some way
evi I.

In a strange way both sides are correct.
The role and influence of the anarchists in Kronstadt remains

rather mysterious.

As a pol itical group, formal organization was an

anathema and as such records appear scarce.
known prominent anarchists wor·e in Kronstadt.

Apparently, in 1921, no
Though a few anarchists

were in Petrograd, the only notable ones were Berkman and Goldman.
of the anarchist ringleaders were dead or in jail.

Most

Some speculation

exists that Perepelkin was an anarchist and that Petrichenko was very
s>'mpathetic to the anarchist cause.

•

The SR-Maximal ists were very close

ideologically to the anarchist·s in terms of their ideal society.

The

Maximal ists were rhetorically more in favor of indiscriminant violence
to achieve their aims.

Kronstadt, in 1921, was not organized along

party I ines during the uprising, nei ther did the padies figure into the
pol itical eouation of the PRe.
Soviets. wi thout parties'.

The slogan of the Kronstadters was 'Free

The communists, in general, were allowed

their freedom and were the only organized pol i tical par·ty at the time.
There were numerous SR-Maximal ists but an SR-Maximal ist party never
arose.

Kronstadt was against the possibil ity of any party dominating so

by de fault no parties emerged.
The absence of prominent anarchists does not preclude anarchist
influence.

•

Kronstadt had a tradition for being .n .narchist stronghold

ba.ck in 1917 with such impodant figures as Efim Yar·chuk and I.S.
Bleichman.

Much of the program adopted, by Kronstadt, in 1917 had

anarchist overtones much to the chagrin of the Bolsheviks.

Most notable
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autho~ity

of the

Bolsheviks.

of much of its
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Pet~og~ad
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the
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K~onstadt

Soviet and
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wa~

coup to the

Octobe~

had been

K~onstadt
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sailo~s
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sailo~
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p~og~am
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•
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we~e

was

we~e
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unde~stand

sailo~s

They

The
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of when necessary.

of

soon to be
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implemented anyway as part of what would be called the New Economic
Pol icy.

What did infuriate the Bolsheviks was the impl ied demand for

the Bolsheviks to give up their monopoly on pol itica! power.
elections to the soviets implied there was a chance that the
woul d fai I to wi n the elect ions.

Free
Corr~unists

Kronstadt ne i ther wan ted to abol ish

the soviet system nor to call bacK the Consti tuent Assemb!>'.

Local

government and direct democracy was an anarchic concept as long as any

authority was subject immediately to the people.
The PRC for the most part I ived up to its demands.

Food rationing

was equalized with exceptions going to children and the ill.

All

positions of authority were subject to election and immediate recall.
Pol i tio.l departments wer'e abol ished leaving no party any unfair

•

adv.ntage, namely the Communists. (Avrich Kron'stadt, 157-159)

In the

factories the concept of 'workers control' was emphasized and
implemented.

Agricultural questions for Kronstadt were not directly

relevant as the island had no significant agricultural production.
Trade unions were freed from state control.

Kronstadt was thoroughly

.gainst 'state control of any sort. (Avrich Kronstadt, 163-166)
Anarchism is strongly averse to the idea of the state, of
organization that breeds authority and party organizations.

The Russian

anarchists proved amenable to a soviet style government <similar to New
England town councils) so long as it served local interests and did not
concentrate power into any group.

As such, Kronstadt disavowed parties

and desired freely elected soviets.

•

facet of the anarchist cause.

Equa.1 i ty was another important

Their particular view sought to maximize

personal freedom as the>' saw it.

Equi table housing, rations and the

abed i shment of property were all impor-tant and ,.ere part of the

•

Kronstadt program, both 1917 and 1921.
were not quite as perfect.

Freedoms of speech and press

Kronstadt only wanted these freedoms

extended to those on the left.

The middle class and gentry were out of

luck unless they· foreswore their posi tions.
sailors elected their

corr~anders.

In the mi I i tary, the

Any position of authority was subject

to election by those whom the position would command.
other soviets were to be on an equal footing.
it was true in 1921.

Relations with

This was true in 1917 and

Demands made by others outside of Kronstadt were

subject to approval by the soviet.

Some of these various views were

shared by the othor pol itical groups of the left but no par·ty proclaimed
to hold all of them.

A strong anarchist influence did exist in

Kronstadt but Kronstadt was not wholly anarchist.

•

Kronstadt was the nadir· of a deep crisis in the 1 ife of the Soviet
Union of the Bolsheviks.

Who are the vi Ilains and who are the saints?

Paul Avrich in Kronstadt 1921 identifies the situation best when he
writes; "Kronstadt presents a situation in which the historian can
sympathize with rebels and still concede that the Bolsheviks were
justified in subduing them.

To recognize this, is to grasp the full

tragedy of Kronstadt." (Avr i ch, Kronstadt, 6)

Li kewi se it is easy to

feel sympathetic to the anarchists who have done much of the writing of
the Kronstadt tragedy.

The anarchists saw Kronstadt as their last hope

for the 'Third Revolution' in Russia.

Kronstadt had all of the

subjective illusions and.ll of the eternal trigger words.

The

anarchists felt that the Bolsheviks had betrayed the revolution and had

•

become exactly what they sought to crush, the counter-revolution.
Berkman writes about an exchange between him and a soldier friend that
had been wounded in the suppression of rebel I ion.

The soldier recalled

2.6
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the horrors of the battle that include,j whole battal i'Jns disappearing in
the broken ice and the enormous losses of I ife.

At the end of his

account, he is quoted as saying, "In Kronstadt I learned the truth.

It

is we [the Bolsheviks] who were the counter-revolutionaries." <Berkman
Bolshevik, 306)
The whole country was in turmoil with various other "Kronstadt"
uprisings occurring allover.

What made Kronstadt unique was its island

fortr'es;;, the sailors, and the n•. ture of their program.
been held in high esteem as 'the pride and

JOY

The sailor's had

of the Revolution.'

Their revolutionary fervor in 1$'17 was unmatched.

The Kronstadt

rebel I ion appears not to have been a counter-revolutionary ploy, but the
danger of the rebel I ion ;;erving counter-revolutionary purposes did

•

exist.

The anarchists claim that the Bolsheviks were wrong in putting

down the rebell ion as they appealed to the sai lor's aims.
one can s:impathize wi th the anarchists and sai

lor·~.

In this regard

However, a case can

be made that suggests the Bolsheviks were correct in suppressing the
rebellion, if for no other reason than the danger it represented that
was beyond the control of the sailors themselves.

On another level one

can see Kronstadt in the I ight of an ideological confl ict between
Marxism and Popul ism.

Lenin bel ieved in what he strove for.

options could rightly exist in Lenin's mind.

No other

The Dictatorship of the

Proletariet was to Lenin the only way to achieve true social ism.
anarchists equally bel ieved in their cause.
for the two.

•

The

No real compromise existed

Kronstadt was the last battle between the two

revolutionary ideologies of Marxism and Anarchism.

They were all

;;elf-proclaimed saints.
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